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Abstract
The development of probability theory together with the Bayesian approach in the
three last centuries is caused by two factors: the variability of the physical phenom-
ena and partial ignorance about them. As now it is standard to believe [1], the nature
of these key factors is so various, that their descriptions are required special uncer-
tainty theories, which differ from the probability theory and the Bayesian credo, and
provide a better account of the various facets of uncertainty by putting together prob-
abilistic and set-valued representations of information to catch a distinction between
variability and ignorance. Eventology [2], a new direction of probability theory and
philosophy, offers the original event approach to the description of variability and ig-
norance, entering an agent, together with his/her beliefs, directly in the frameworks
of scientific research in the form of eventological distribution of his/her own events.
This allows eventology, by putting together probabilistic and set-event representa-
tion of information and philosophical concept of event as co-being [3], to provide a
unified strong account of various aspects of uncertainty catching distinction between
variability and ignorance and opening an opportunity to define imprecise probability
as a probability of imprecise event in the mathematical frameworks of Kolmogorov’s
probability theory [4].
Keywords: uncertainty, probability, event, co-being, eventology, imprecise event.
1 Introduction
It is usually accepted to believe [1] that the development of contemporary uncertainty the-
ories (the theory of imprecise probabilities, evidence, and possibility theory) was caused by
juncture of two challenges: assimilating the variability of physical processes and mastering
account of incompleteness of information in cognitive and decision processes. Juncture
of these challenges are related by the fact: “in the face of variability and ignorance, it is
impossible to know what the present state of the Being (physical together with mental)
is”.
At least there are two more challenges, which do not find the worthy answer in con-
temporary uncertainty theories: the assimilating set-event-based representations of partial
ignorance and the entering human agents in the form of their set-event-based models di-
rectly in the framework of scientific research of uncertainty. The eventology has found
answers to these challenges outside a quantitative level of researches (including a level
of probabilities), considering and solving problems of uncertainty at higher and at more
difficult level of events, at the set-event level.
14 12th International EM’2009 Conference, Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, Russia, February 27 ∼ 28, 2009
Eventology [2], a new direction of probability theory and philosophy, offers the original
event approach to the description of variability and ignorance, entering an agent, together
with his/her beliefs, directly in the frameworks of scientific research in the form of even-
tological distribution of his/her own events. This allows eventology, by putting together
probabilistic and set-event representations of information, and philosophical concept of
event as co-being [3], to provide a unified strong account of various aspects of uncertainty
catching distinction between variability and ignorance in the mathematical frameworks
of Kolmogorov’s probability theory [4].
Now eventology is a broad spectrum of scientific researches, which includes mathe-
matical, philosophical, and practical eventology. The volume of this paper is not enough
for a statement of fundamental bases of eventology (an event as a co-being; event and
probability as two interconnected concepts, which cannot exist separately; an event as
a Kolmogorov axiomatic event; a probability as a Kolmogorov axiomatic probability;
various probability interpretations known now as different ways of assessment of Kol-
mogorov’s axiomatic probability; each object (physical or mental) as a distribution of its
set of events; each human agent as a distribution of his/her set of events). Therefore the
paper contains only brief enumeration of basic concepts of this new direction of probabil-
ity theory and philosophy, added by the detailed eventological analysis of the example of
set-based representations of partial ignorance offered in [1]. The author hopes that anal-
ysis of this example will assist to illustrate and to understand opening opportunities of
the new eventological description of uncertainty, variability, ignorance and impreciseness.
Partially to compensate a cable style of a statement of the paper there is a detailed
list of references to papers that are sources of the ideas put in a basis of eventology;
have the direct relation to eventological subjects; and represent areas of researches, where
eventological methods can be effectively used.
2 Contemporary theories of uncertainty
Below the list of basic contemporary uncertainty theories together with references to
leading authors is resulted:
• theories of uncertainty —
– fuzzy set theory :
Lotfi Ascer Zadeh [5],
– fuzzy logic :
Lotfi Ascer Zadeh [5, 6], Vilem Novak, Irina Perfilieva, Jiri Mockor [7],
– intuitionistic fuzzy sets :
Eulalia Szmidt, Janusz Kacprzyk [8],
– possibility theory :
Lotfi Ascer Zadeh [9], Didier Dubois, Henri Prade [10, 11, 12, 13, 14],
– evidence theory :
Arthur P. Dempster [15], Glenn Shafer [16, 17], Philippe Smets [18, 19, 20],
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– theory of imprecise probabilities :
Peter Walley [21, 22, 23], Gert de Cooman [24, 25], Arnold Neumaier [26],
– generalized theory of uncertainty : (Lotfi Ascer Zadeh [27], Didier Dubois [1]).
3 Ways of assessment of a probability
Now in eventology various probability interpretations existing are considered as various
ways of an assessment of the same Kolmogorov axiomatic probability instead of as various
concepts of probability. There are two broad categories of probability interpretations,
which can be called physical and evidential probabilities. Physical probabilities, also
called objective or frequency probabilities, are associated with random physical systems.
Evidential probability, also called subjective or Bayesian probability, are associated with
human agents and their beliefs. More detailed classification of probability interpretations
known now with references to authors is resulted below:
• physical —
– classical and frequency :
Jacob Bernoulli [28], Pierre Simon Laplace [29], John Venn [30], Hans Reichen-
bach [31], Richard Edler von Mises [32], Sir Ronald Aylmer Fisher [33, 34],
Jerzy Splawa Neyman [35] and Egon Sharpe Pearson [36],
– propensity :
Karl Raimund Popper [37, 38], David W. Miller [39], Ronald N. Giere [40] and
James Henry Fetzer [41, 42],
– algorithmic:
Ray Solomonoff [43, 44];
• evidential —
– classical, epistemic or inductive:
Reverend Thomas Bayes [45], Pierre Simon Laplace [29], Frank Hyneman
Knight [46], Richard Threlkeld Cox [47],
– logical :
John Maynard Keynes [48], Rudolf Carnap [49],
– subjective:
Frank Plumpton Ramsey [50], Bruno de Finetti [51, 52], Leonard Jimmie Sav-
age [53], Francis John Anscombe and Israel Robert John Aumann [54], Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky [55, 56, 57, 58],
– intuitive:
Bernard Osgood Koopman [59], Irvin John Good [60], George Lennox Sharman
Shackle [61, 62, 63], Kenneth Joseph Arrow and Gerard Debreu [64, 65, 66],
Edi Karni [67],
– Bayesian:
Edwin Thompson Jaynes [68], Jose Miguel Bernardo [69],
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– informatively rationalistic :
John Charles Harsanyi [70],
– imprecise:
Peter Walley [21, 22, 23], Gert de Cooman [24, 25], Arnold Neumaier [26].
So, eventology asserts that the listed authors offer only various ways of assessment of
the same axiomatic probability, but not various concepts of probability. Moreover, even-
tology suggests to ascent of even-based level of analysis from a quantitative level of assess-
ment of probability and to analyze similar ways of assessment of corresponding events:
physical (classical, frequency, as propensity, and algorithmic) and evidential (classical,
cognitive, inductive, logic, subjective, intuitive, Bayesian, informatively rationalistic, and
imprecise). As a result various ways of assessment of the axiomatic probability, offered by
the listed authors, it is possible to interpret as axiomatic probability of the events assessed
in the corresponding various ways. For example, the imprecise probability can be inter-
preted as axiomatic probability of corresponding imprecise event, the new eventological
notion which demands strict definition within eventology1.
4 Probability as an axiomatic probability
Kolmogorov’s axiomatics is a standard axiomatic approach to the mathematical descrip-
tion of event and probability; it is offered by Andrei Kolmogorov in 1929 and 1933 [4]; it
has given probability theory the style accepted in the modern mathematics. Up to Kol-
mogorov attempts to axiomatize of probability theory were undertook by G. Bohlmann
[72], S. N. Bernstein [73], R. Mizes [74], and also A. Lomnitsky [75] on the basis of E.
Borel’s ideas [76] about connection of concepts of probability and measure:
• axiomatic probability —
– Andrei N. Kolmogorov [4],
– G. Bolmann [72], Felix Edouard Justin Emile Borel [76], Sergei N. Bernstein
[73], Richard Edler von Mises [74], and A. Lomnicki [75].
5 Event as a co-being
Among authors of modern theories of events three authors: M. Bakhtin [77, 78], A.
Kolmogorov [4], and B. Russell [79, 80] have played a key role in becoming eventology
as science. Bakhtin has proved a concept of event as a co-being; Kolmogorov has given
an axiomatic definition of event in his axiomatics of probability theory; and Russell has
emphasized: “matter is simply convenient way of linkage of events together”. Below the
list of authors of modern theories of events is resulted:
1In the same way, as in eventology the conditional probability is defined as probability conditional
event, the new notion, which is introduced in [71] for the first time.
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• theories of events —
– Michael M. Bakhtin [77, 78],
– Andrei N. Kolmogorov [4],
– Bertrand Arthur William Russell [79, 80],
– Nikolai O. Lossky [81], Henri Bergson [82], Martin Heidegger [83], Sigmund
Freud [84], Gilles Deleuze [85], Donald Davidson [86], David Kellogg Lewis
[87], Alain Badiou [88], and Jaegwan Kim [89].
6 Eventology
Eventology is the study on events, arisen from “unbearably light” observations: “event2 is
always co-being” [77, 3]; “matter is a simply convenient way of linkage of events together3”
[79]; “mental behavior arises there and then, where and when an ability to make prob-
abilistic choice is arisen4” [91]; and “mind is a simply convenient way of a probabilistic
choice of perceiving and creating the sets of events5” [2].
• Authors of initial eventological ideas:
– Michael M. Bakhtin [77, 3, 78],
– Bertrand Arthur William Russell [79]
– Vladimir A. Levebvre [91]
– Oleg Yu. Vorobyev [2]
Mathematical eventology is a new section of probability theory based on Kolmogorov’s
axiomatics, already shown the efficiency in the mathematical description of eventologi-
cal substantiation and development of existing uncertainty theories (fuzzy sets theory,
possibility theory, and theory of evidence), and contemporary prospect theory also.
Step by step alongside with philosophical and mathematical questions of Being and
co-being of human agents the eventology masters the impressing domain of economic,
sociological and psychological questions [92], [93], [94], [95], [96], [97], [98], [99], [100],
[101], [102], [103], [104], [105], [106], [107], [108], [109], [110], [2], [111], [112], [113], [114],
[115], [116], [117], [118], [119], [120].
2“The Russian word used, “sobytie”, is the normal word Russian would use in most contexts to mean
what we call in English an “event”. In Russian, “event” is a word having both a root and a stem; it is
formed from the word for being — “bytie” — with the addition of the prefix implying sharedness, “so-”,
(or, as we should say in English, “co-” as co-operate or co-habit), giving “sobytie”, event as co-being.
“Being” for Bakhtin then is, not just an event, but an event that is shared. Being is a simultaneitly; it
is always co-being [78, p. 25]”.
3To his universal event-based definition of matter Russell has come as a result of the deep analysis of
achievements of modern physics [79].
4At once from the surprising event-probability definition of mental behavior, which Lefebvre has given,
basing on results of experimental psychology (see [90], for example), and from Bakhtin’s brilliant definition
of event as co-being follows the one of starting eventological idea: event as co-being and probability are
two interconnected concepts nonexistent separately.
5The event-based definition of mind, which is key in eventology, follows from resulted above Bakhtin’s
definition of event, Russell’s definition of matter, and Lefebvre’s definition of mental behavior directly.
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6.1 Random finite set of events (RFSE)
Let X be a finite set of Kolmogorov’s events (|X| = N <∞), chosen from the algebra F
of the eventological space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω is the set of all possible outcomes of Being,
i.e. the set of all possible states of World; 2X is the set of all subsets of X.
The random finite set of events (RFSE) is defined as a random element with values
from 2X, i.e. as a measurable map K : (Ω,F ,P)→
(
2X, 2(2
X)
)
. At an outcome of Being
ω ∈ Ω there come those events x ∈ X, for that ω ∈ x. From here possible values of K are
subsets K(ω) = {x ∈ X : ω ∈ x} of such events x ∈ X that come at the outcome ω, i.e.
K(ω) ∈ 2X (or K(ω) ⊆ X), thus for any X ⊆ X
{ω : K(ω) = X} =
⋂
x∈X
x
⋂
x∈Xc
xc, (1)
where xc = Ω − x, Xc = X − X. The event ter(X) = ⋂x∈X x⋂x∈Xc xc is called the
event-terrace. As a value of K(ω) a subset X is interpreted as the subset of events from
X that occur at the outcome ω ∈ ter(X), and Xc = X−X is interpreted as the subset of
events from X that do not occur at the ω.
By
p(X) = P(K = X) = P (ter(X)) (2)
denote the probability of the event-terrace ter(X), i.e. the probability of the event {K =
X}. All of 2N events-terraces, generated by the finite set of events X, form a finite partition
of the certain event Ω =
∑
X⊆X ter(X). From here
∑
X⊆X p(X) = 1, so probabilities p(X)
of events-terraces ter(X), taken all together for X ⊆ X, form something that can be
named a probability distribution of RFSE K because of K(ω) = X as ω ∈ ter(X). Here
the function p : 2X → [0, 1] is some function of the set of events (or set-function). Values
of the set-function p on subsets of events X ⊆ X are probabilities of corresponding events-
terraces ter(X) ∈ FX. It’s clear that a set-function p, corresponding any RFSE, should
satisfy to two obvious conditions:
1) to be non-negative: p(X) ≥ 0, X ⊆ X;
2) to be normed:
∑
X⊆X p(X) = 1.
7 Eventological analysis of set-based interpretations
of partial ignorance [1]
The ascent of an event-based level of thinking from a quantitative level of thinking assumes
consecutive development of a set-based level of thinking and a level of thinking under
uncertainty. During the ascention it is necessary to overcome step by step our inertia of
quantitative thinking, an imperfection of our skills of set-thinking, and our aversion of
uncertainty at last.
First, it is necessary to ascend: from a number up to a set of numbers; from a set
of numbers up to a set of any elements; from a set of any elements up to an axiomatic
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event. Then, having taken this height, it is necessary to ascend from number up to
a random variable and to continue the ascent: from a random variable up to a set of
random variables; from a set of random variables up to a set of any random elements;
from a set of any random elements up to a set of Kolmogorov’s events.
Let’s illustrate this process of our mental ascent of event-based level of thinking by
eventological analysis of the example of set-based representations of partial ignorance
offered in [1], where it is declared: “the basic tool for representing information incom-
pleteness is set theory: an ill-known quantity is represented as a disjunctive set, i.e. a
subset of mutually exclusive values, one of which is the real one”.
Logically this assertion has no defects. However such logic can use only at a quanti-
tative level of thinking. The matter is that the assertion silently bases on the property of
order of numbers. But this property, which is characteristic for any quantitative structure,
is not kept by offered set-based representation of an ill-known quantity by disjunctive set
of mutually excluding values.
Then this truncated set-based representation is used for construction of the same
truncated event-based representation of information incompleteness. The obtained event-
based representation appears to be true only for embedded structures of events6, instead
of for any structures of events. As a result this leads to the following partial7 set-based
definition of “a possible event” and “a certain event” [1]:
• Any event A understand as the assertion x ∈ A is “possible” (for this agent)8
whenever [a, b] ∩ A is not empty.
• Any such event A is “certain” for this agent9, whenever [a, b] ⊆ A.
The definition of “possible event” and “certain event” is key for set-based representa-
tions of partial ignorance and for all of set theoretic base of contemporary theories of uncer-
tainty: possibility theory [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14], theory of evidences [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20],
theory of imprecise probabilities [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26], and unified theory of uncertainty
[27, 1]. Therefore let’s analyze this definition from the eventological point of view in more
detail.
Theoretical value and fruitfulness of characteristic replacement of any physical objects
by events has been underlined by Russell [79]. The author has specified on theoretical
inevitability of the same characteristic substitution events for any mental objects [2]: from
the eventological point of view everything in World (physical and/or mental) can be char-
acterized by events. However such characterization should be well defined eventologically
in the sense that the resulted set of events should possess the characteristic properties:
the event-based description should contain all characteristic properties of the physical
and/or mental object.
6As the embedded structures at a set-based level keep characteristic properties of order structures at
a quantitative level.
7Suitable only for a quantitative level of thinking.
8added by me.
9a bold is mine.
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A set of numbers as a set of Kolmogorov’s embedded events. Let’s continue our anal-
ysis. In the example [1] “an event” A, understood as “x ∈ A”, where x is an ill-known
quantity, is placed on a numerical axis and is defined as some set of numbers: A ⊆ R.
Thus “the event” A is defined as a set of elements forming structure of the order. In the
example such definition of “event” A is not well defined eventologically10: “the event”
A does not characterize a set of ordered elements because of it does not contain the de-
scription of order structure. It is impossible “to restore” the order of elements of the any
(disorder) set, “knowing” only what set is and “not knowing” that its elements possess
the property of order (in the example these ordered elements are numbers).
More well defined from the eventological point of view “event” A is represented as the
some set A ⊆ X11 of Kolmogorov’s embedded events y = {r ≤ ry} ∈ X, corresponding to
numbers ry ∈ R.
So, the “event” A in the example is some set of numbers from R. It is not well
defined eventologically. While our set of Kolmogorov’s embedded events A is well defined
eventologically as A =
{
{r ≤ ry} ⊆ R, y ∈ A
}
, a set of subsets of numbers from R,
“storing the information” about the order structure of numbers12.
An agent as a set of Kolmogorov’s events. In eventology each object (physical and/or
mental) is considered as a finite set of Kolmogorov’s events, which characterizes this
object, certainly, not entirely, but characterizes eventologically completely within the
frameworks of some chosen finite set of events X. As the eventology reduces everything
to events the behavior of some agent within the frameworks of the chosen set of events X
is eventologically described by this set of events.
Let’s continue an event-based analysis of the example, in which a behavior of the
human agent is exhausted by his/her choice of [a, b] ⊆ R for x: “asserting x ∈ [a, b] comes
down to declaring (by the agent)13 any value outside [a, b] as impossible for x”. As above,
the set of numbers [a, b] ⊆ R is eventologically characterized by the set of Kolmogorov’s
embedded events [a, b] =
{
{r ≤ ry} ⊆ R, y ∈ [a, b]
}
.
Let’s limit a choice of our agent by the set 2X, the set of all subsets of finite set of
Kolmogorov’s embedded events X. This finite set characterizes an individual behavior of
the agent eventologically completely in a context of our example. In each problem always
eventology assumes that the same initial eventological space (Ω,F ,P) is defined, where
Ω is the set of all possible outcomes of Being (physical together with mental), i.e. the set
of all possible states of World, and F is the algebra of events from Ω.
The set of events X, characterizing our agent, consists of the events chosen from
10Given definition is quite well defined within the limits of a quantitative level, but cannot be applied
without changes outside a quantitative level, at a set-based level and, especially, at an event-based level.
11X is a some fixed set of the embedded events, which are of interest.
12Notice that while our analysis is spent exclusively at an event-based level and about any probability,
which is so carefully avoided from all of theories of uncertainty, speech does not go. At the same time, a
probability measure, defined on this set of Kolmogorov’s embedded events, determines the corresponding
distribution function, which characterizes some random variable on R.
13added by me.
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algebra F : X ⊆ F ; each event y ∈ X has probability P(y); and all of the set of
events X is characterized by the probability distribution {p(Y ), Y ⊆ X}, where p(Y ) =
P
(⋂
y∈Y y
⋂
y∈Y c y
c
)
is the probability of so-called event-terrace ter(Y ) =
⋂
y∈Y y
⋂
y∈Y c y
c,
“numbered” by the subset of events Y ⊆ X.
In eventology any finite set of events X ⊆ F corresponds to the random finite set
of events K : (Ω,F ,P) →
(
2X, 2(2
X)
)
that is characterized by the same eventological
distribution {p(Y ), Y ⊆ X} as the set of events X. Event-terraces ter(Y ) and their
probabilities p(Y ) are treated by one more equivalent way: ter(Y ) = {ω : K(ω) = Y },
p(Y ) = P(K = Y ), Y ⊆ X.
Thus one can characterize any human agent by two equivalent eventological models:
by the set of events X and by the random set of events K, which have identical probability
distributions written down in two following ways: p(Y ) = P(ter(Y )) = P(K = Y ), Y ⊆
X. In eventology similar probability distributions, which have double event interpretation,
are called eventological distributions usually. Therefore within a context of each concrete
example or problem it is possible to use two equivalent expressions: “the agent X” or/and
“the agent K” without any loss of generality of the event characteristization of the agent.
Let’s return to the eventological analysis of definition of the “possible event” and
“certain event” from the example. To everyone it is clear that only the agent is a source of
his/her partial ignorance about value x. An uncertainty is incorporated in his/her choice
of a set of events [a, b] ⊆ X. From the eventological point of view an agent is characterized
by his/her individual random set of events K. This means that a choice by the agent
K of this or that set of events Y = [a, b] for an estimation of an ill-known quantity x is
characterized by his/her individual probability distribution p(Y ) = P(K = Y ), Y ⊆ X.
Let’s give an eventological well defined variant of the following definition of “possible
event” and “certain event” offered in [1]:
• Any set of events A understand as the assertion x ∈ A is “possible” for the agent
K whenever K ∩ A 6= ∅.
• Any such set of events A is “certain” for the agent K, whenever K ⊆ A.
The individual probability distribution of the agent eventologically completely char-
acterizes his/her behavior within the frameworks of the chosen set of events X and defines
the probability of any event connected with the agent K and with any subsets of events
A ⊆ X. This concerns also the events appearing in the eventological variant of defini-
tion of “possible event” and “certain event”. Probabilities of these events are equal to
P(K ∩ A 6= ∅) = P
(⋃
y∈A y
)
= uA, P(K ⊆ A) = P
(⋂
y∈Ac y
c
)
= pA and are connected
by the dual relation: uA = 1− pAc .
In eventology these two set-functions uA and p
A have a strict probability sense. At the
same time these set-functions possess the same set-theoretic properties as set-functions,
used recently in the theory of possibilities (possibility function Π(A) = uA and necessity
function N(A) = pA)14 and in the theory of evidences (plausibility function Pl(A) = uA
14Notice that for embedded events set-functional relations uA = maxy∈AP(y) and pA = 1 −
and belief function Bel(A) = pA).
In eventology given two sets of probabilities {uX , X ⊆ X} and {pX , X ⊆ X}
are considered as various forms of eventological distribution of the same set of events
X. In total in eventology [2] the six basic forms of eventological distribution are used:
p(X), pX , p
X , u(X), uX , u
X , X ⊆ X, all of which are connected in pairs by Mo¨bius inver-
sion formulas [2], for example,
pX =
∑
Y⊆X
p(Y ), p(X) =
∑
Y⊆X
(−1)|X|−|Y |pY ,
1− uX =
∑
X⊆Y
p(Y c), p(X) =
∑
Y⊆X
(−1)|X|−|Y |(1− uY c),
or by dual relations: p(X) = 1− u(Xc), pX = 1− uXc , pX = 1− uXc .
8 Conclusions
The eventology offers the event-based approach to description of variability and ignorance,
entering agents together with their beliefs directly in frameworks of scientific research in
the form of eventological distributions of their own events. This allows eventology to
provide the uniform and strict account of various aspects of the uncertainty, catching
distinction between variability, ignorance, and impreciseness in mathematical frameworks
of Kolmogorov’s probability theory.
We emphasize that contemporary uncertainty theories could pass without special ef-
forts to eventologically correct use of the concepts of event and set of events and also to
eventologically correct description of sets of the objects in various applications, having
received in exchange a unique opportunity to improve its mathematical tools by meth-
ods of the mathematical eventology, based on Kolmogorov’s probability theory, and also
to develop philosophical interpretations of event, uncertainty, variability, ignorance, and
impreciseness on the basis of achievements of the philosophical eventology.
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